2024 Elections

During my five and a half years at the US Embassy in London working for the State Department, I reported on two UK general elections, including the 2017 one which was called almost as I walked through the Embassy’s door for the first time. Although a bit of a trial by fire for me at the time, it was good practice for understanding what the State Department cares about during elections and key political events in the UK.

Two of the key questions always asked, whether during manifesto season or a routine fiscal event like a Budget, were:

What are the main political parties’ views of NATO?
Do they plan to spend at least two per cent of GDP on defence spending?

The latter became especially important during the second Trump presidency, which was a matter of keen interest and importance to the then-President and is arguably one of his enduring foreign policy legacies.

Although I left the US Department of State two years ago, I can only assume that those questions have taken on even greater importance as Europe’s security dynamic changed following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the reignition of conflict in Israel/Palestine.

The questions are also likely to have become even more important because of the current critical and unique time in US and UK relations. The Labour Party is on course to become the next government after 14 years of Conservative rule and most polls predict it will have a large majority in Parliament, making it far easier for it to achieve its legislative aims.

Labour’s leader, Sir Keir Starmer, has made a great fanfare of promising to uphold the UK’s standing amongst its allies and partners, even as it attempts to straddle the divide between the UK strategic interests and its core voting. A key example is the American de facto security guarantee of the state of Israel and Labour’s much more pro-Palestinian membership and voter base. In what will likely become a key headache for Starmer, should he become PM, will be upholding the UK’s special relationship with the US and his legislative and foreign policy agenda in Parliament, in a similar vein to the years of Tony Blair and President George W. Bush. As an early indicator of what may lie ahead, one of the only rebellions Starmer has faced from his party was on a non-binding motion about the Israel/Palestine conflict in the weeks following Hamas’ 7 October attack but before the Israeli Defence Force has started its offensive into Gaza in earnest; the rebellion saw over a quarter of Labour MPs vote against Starmer’s stance, including several shadow ministers.

Starmer also has a political history that may raise an eyebrow for incoming foreign service officers, having previously served in the shadow Cabinet of Jeremy Corbyn as his shadow Brexit secretary. Corbyn, even after Starmer pushed him out of the Labour Party, had and continues to hold strong views about American and British foreign policy, the UK’s nuclear deterrent, and the Russia/Ukraine and Israel/Palestine conflicts, which Starmer had to defend whilst in the shadow Cabinet. Most of those views are, of course, less than aligned with traditional US foreign policy positions. Although I have never had the impression that Starmer plans to drop his commitments to NATO and defence spending, it will likely be a question on internal minds, given his tendency to say whatever necessary to win a vote and consolidate power on his path to No. 10. Labour’s shadow foreign office and defence teams have, however, taken the lead in building strong ties throughout the diplomatic community in London and Washington D.C. over the past few years in anticipation of seizing power in July, so there is a low probability of any surprises amongst those who track Labour’s foreign policy positions.

Labour’s shadow foreign office and defence teams have, however, taken the lead in building strong ties throughout the diplomatic community in London and Washington D.C. over the past few years in anticipation of seizing power in July, so there is a low probability of any surprises amongst those who track Labour’s foreign policy positions.

On the US side, November of course brings the rematch of President Biden and former President Trump. This contest will have extensive effects on America’s international coalition of allies and partners and will probably complicate matters for whoever holds the keys to No. 10. If President Trump ends up returning to the White House, as most polls currently predict, he will also likely be in control of the Senate. A pro-Trump majority in the Senate would make it much easier for him to exert his power through the machinery of government because most political appointees need to be confirmed by the Senate, meaning fewer delays during the appointment process and quicker foreign policy decisionmaking.

Against this backdrop of big national changes in the US and UK, the UK’s manifesto season, where the political parties outline their blueprints and directions of travel for government, has been fairly unremarkable for foreign policy watchers and practitioners. All the UK’s main political parties, barring the SNP, would increase defence spending, maintain the UK’s nuclear deterrent and position in NATO, and support Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression, in a demonstration of how different the geopolitical landscape has become since 2019. The SNP, which only campaigns in Scotland, is the outlier, proposing to abolish the UK’s nuclear deterrent to channel that funding into domestic priorities and conventional defence spending. Given Labour is currently expected to overtake the SNP as the party in Scotland with the most MPs in Westminster, the SNP’s view is unlikely to carry much weight.

All of these manifestoes are of course background noise to the anticipated healthy majority that Labour is set to have when in power. It is therefore Labour’s manifesto which is the most important and will be pored over most intently by many in the diplomatic community.

The UK’s manifesto season, where the political parties outline their blueprints and directions of travel for government, has been fairly unremarkable for foreign policy watchers and practitioners

Positively, much of Labour’s international policy proposals are both orthodox and advanced, likely in an attempt to ease any international anxieties regarding Starmer’s serving under Corbyn and the not insignificant chunk of Labour voters that retain a pacifist, NATO-critical streak. Tellingly, the Labour manifesto says more on defence and international affairs than any party’s other manifesto.

In essence, Labour would seek to:

Maintain the nuclear deterrent
Maintain full obligations to NATO
Invest in soft power resources like the BBC, courts, and universities
Defend the international rule of law
Maintain and grow the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the US, regardless of who is in office i.e. President Trump
Create a new UK/EU security pact
Support Ukraine and advocate for its eventual inclusion in NATO
Cooperate, compete, and challenge China where appropriate

These proposals contrast sharply with Labour’s 2019 manifesto under Corbyn, where human rights, inquiries into the UK’s colonial past, support for global marginalised groups, and climate diplomacy played much more prominent roles. The juxtaposition does show how far Starmer has moved the Labour Party, but in practise, this manifesto, where its foreign policy aims are better suited to the 2024 world and the UK’s strategic interests, will free up Labour to focus more on the domestic issues most of the Cabinet cares about.

The key question, or what would have been the follow up question from my time at State, is how could this change depending on the size of Labour’s majority? With a large enough majority, Starmer should be able to balance Labour’s foreign policy commitments and ambitions alongside the party’s wider and more fleshed out domestic priorities, creating a bit of a buffer zone for MPs willing to rebel and forego a position in government for six-month periods. However, if the polls prove less accurate, and Starmer ends up with a smaller majority, or potentially even a coalition, he may end up having to cater to some of Labour’s members and voters that are less comfortable with the brutal, and sometimes ugly reality of foreign policy – and, importantly, who Starmer’s counterpart is in the White House. Those key questions won’t be answerable for a few weeks and months, respectively, yet.

Michael Martins is also an Associate Fellow of the British Foreign Policy Group.